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Abstract
Background: In planning for universal health coverage, many countries have been examining their fiscal decentralization 
policies with the goal of increasing efficiency and equity via “additionalities.” The concept of “additionality,” when the 
government of a lower administrative level increases the funding allocated to a particular issue when extra funds are 
present, is often used in these contexts. Although the definition of “additionality” can be used more broadly, for the 
purposes of this paper we focus narrowly on the additional allocation of primary healthcare expenditures. This paper 
explores this idea by examining the impact of central level primary healthcare expenditure, on individual state level 
contributions to primary healthcare expenditure within 16 Indian states between 2005 and 2013. 
Methods: In examining 5 main variables, we compared differences between government expenditures, contributions, 
and revenues for Empowered Action Group  (EAG) states, and non-EAG states. EAG states are normally larger states that 
have weaker public health infrastructure and hence qualify for additional funding. Finally, using a model that captured 
the quantity of central level primary healthcare expenditure distributions to these states, we measured its impact on each 
state’s own contributions to primary healthcare spending.
Results: Our results show that, at the state level, growth in per capita central level primary healthcare expenditure 
has increased by 110% from 2005-2013, while state’s own contributions to primary healthcare expenditure per capita 
increased by 32%. Further analyses show that a 1% change disbursement from the central level leads to a -0.132%, 
although not significant, change by states in their own expenditure. The effect for wealthier states is -0.151% and 
significant and for poorer states the effect is smaller at -0.096% and not significant. 
Conclusion: This analysis suggests that increases in central level primary healthcare expenditure to states have an inverse 
relationship with primary healthcare expenditures by the state level. Furthermore, this effect is more pronounced in 
wealthier Indian states. This finding has policy implications on India’s decision to increase block grants to states in place 
of targeted program expenditures.
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Implications for policy makers
• Block grants allocated to lower levels for healthcare services, such as the National Health Mission (NHM) in India, can influence lower level 
spending on health. 
• Examining the relationship between cental allocations and lower level spending is important to understand the impact of these financing 
mechanisms.
• More specifically, findings from this study are important to Indian policymakers in assessing how funds disbursed at the central level can be 
better allocated to lower levels in order to both, achieve universal health coverage, and improve efficiency, and equity for poorer states in the 
coming years.
Implications for the public
Findings from our study demonstrate that in India, “additionalities” for primary healthcare persist when extra funds are present. Though focused 
solely on India, this study has policy implications, especially for other federal states and those countries that are in the process or considering 
decentralization. These results reveal a disconnect between the spending priorities at different levels of government, demonstrating that decisions 
on whether to maintain or supplement funding for specific programs depend on varying factors across Indian states. Given that the general public is 
often the direct recipients of these funds, they both stand the most to gain if targeted areas are supplemented with additional funds, and the most to 
lose if the funding for such programs is at most maintained, or worse decreased.
Key Messages 
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Background
As fiscal policies evolve and countries around the globe plan 
for universal health coverage, countries are re-examining 
their fiscal decentralization policies.1-3 In many contexts, 
some form of fiscal federalism will be contemplated as part 
of the reform process. Fiscal federalism is defined as both 
the conditional or unconditional allocation of funds by a 
central or federal government to lower level provinces or 
states and often involves a level of political and administrative 
decentralization with regard to specific programs, such as 
healthcare.4 In countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, South 
Africa, and India, subnational levels are already responsible 
for a significant portion of the total health spending in the 
country. For example, in India, as of 2007, 68% of public 
health spending is executed at the state or lower level.5 
Research and analyses surrounding fiscal federalism and 
incentives, has examined many outcomes, including changes 
in both redistribution and efficiency.2,5,6 Much of the literature 
on fiscal federalism and other forms of decentralization 
has focused on how allocations have improved inequalities 
across lower-level entities.7-10 Another rich source of literature 
examined the important policy question of whether lower 
levels maintain or ement spending in a particular area as a 
result of receiving additional funds, sometimes referred 
to as “additionality” or “crowding in.”11,12 Research on the 
additionality effect at the national level has shown that 
countries reduce their domestic funding for health in response 
to increased donor funding for health.11,13,14 Similar research 
on the crowding effect, also finds varying patterns of lower 
level expenditures given changing federal allocations.11 Given 
these are similar ideas, for the purpose of this paper we will 
refer to the use of additional funds as “additionality.” All of 
the research above has focused on an attempt to answer what 
the patterns or deviations from the norms are, given changing 
relationships between the central and lower levels. This paper 
uses variations in central level expenditure across different 
states in India to understand the relationship between central 
expenditure and lower-level spending on primary healthcare. 
Understanding the effects of fiscal federalism on overall 
resource allocation is important in its own right. However, 
the concept is even more important as it relates to subnational 
spending on primary healthcare. The Lancet’s “Global Health 
2035” Commission has stressed the importance of investments 
in primary healthcare and public health systems for improved 
population health, health equity, and economic development 
in low- and middle-income countries.15 Although the 
Commission more generally highlights the improvements 
that follow from investments in health, the Commission 
specifically emphasizes the substantial benefits that arise 
from investing in primary healthcare.15 In addition, a focus 
on primary healthcare is essential for achieving universal 
health coverage.16-19 Karan et al have found that the Indian 
government, despite a health insurance package targeted at the 
urban poor, has failed to protect low-income populations from 
catastrophic health spending.18 Out of pocket expenditures as 
a percentage of central health expenditure in India is as high 
as 65% in 2015, and has remained at that level since 2010.20 
These results provide an important justification for increasing 
spending in countries like India, where minimal financial 
investments in health can not only yield large economic 
benefits, but also increase access, and reduce out-of-pocket 
payments.15 
Primary healthcare is mainly the responsibility of states 
and lower level entities in India.21 Within India’s government 
health system, responsibilities for health and health-related 
services are largely with state health departments and their 
subordinate units. There are important functions related 
to nutrition or sanitation and water supply that are more 
focused in other departments. Federal financing makes up 
about one third of overall government health financing with 
states contributing most of the rest with incorporation of 
some central support as discussed in this paper. Recent years 
have seen efforts to increase the role of local government 
institutions  (Panchayati Raj Insitutions or PRIs), especially 
in community public health functions.22 PRIs do receive 
some support from government departments including 
health  (under National Health Mission [NHM]) and others, 
however financing for PRIs do not account for a large share 
of government health financing. Understanding how central 
level transfers for primary healthcare affect state level 
expenditure on primary healthcare is key to developing more 
effective national policies. 
There are a number of studies that examine patterns of fiscal 
federalism as it relates to healthcare spending in countries 
around the globe.5,6,23 Several of these papers have focused on 
India, as it is one of the largest federal states where a significant 
percentage of central healthcare funding is allocated to the 
lower level.5 One study examines fiscal federalism and the 
subsequent substitution effect in India, showing a negative 
relationship between central allocations and state level 
expenditure. This is a critically important study on this topic 
in India, and provides sound analytical econometric modeling 
that can be updated and enhanced with the most recent data.24 
In using the most recent data available, this paper adds to the 
literature by empirically examining both the impact of fiscal 
federalism on Indian state and subnational level expenditure 
in a large country using data across a large number of years. 
Fiscal Federalism in India
Government healthcare in India is principally financed by 
individual states. However, given the large variability in state 
governments’ spending abilities, the central government 
allocates substantial transfers of funding for health to the 
states. Most of the central government’s transfers are for 
primary healthcare and come through the NHM  (originally 
the National Rural Health Mission, NRHM), which focuses 
on providing healthcare to vulnerable populations and to 
states with greater financial need.25 Thus, central transfers are 
important for financing primary healthcare, both in terms 
of their direct contributions but also in terms of how they 
affect resource allocation decisions to primary health in the 
individual states. 
The initial NRHM, launched on April 12, 2005 by the 
Government of India, was focused on 18 Empowered Action 
Group  (EAG) states, which are Indian States that have been 
identified as larger, poorer states with weak public health 
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indicators and infrastructure that qualify for additional 
funding and programs  (Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Uttar 
Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, 
Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir, 
Himachal Pradesh). EAG and non-EAG States differ with 
regard to a number of health metrics. For example, life 
expectancy in non-EAG states is around 72 years, while 
in EAG states it is about 68 years.26 Similarly, the maternal 
mortality ratio is around 85 maternal deaths per 100 000 live 
births in non-EAG states and it is 188 maternal deaths per 
100 000 live births in EAG states.27 The focus of the NRHM 
was to expand access to priority primary healthcare services 
through increased central grants to states.28 Furthermore, 
it was also designed to improve efficiency as well as reduce 
inequalities across states. The NHM included an urban 
component.
To improve public spending efficiency, there were several 
different grants from the center dispersed to states. Some 
grants were tied directly to federally prescribed program 
designs and others, like NHM, allowed flexible spending 
designed to address state-specific conditions and priorities. 
Furthermore, to reduce spending disparities across states, 
central grants were designed to be more generous to EAG and 
northeastern states in comparison to others. 
To incentivize states to spend more of their own resources 
on primary healthcare, central grants for NHM were tied to 
explicit co-funding requirements. However, the amount of the 
central government transfer to the state level for this initiative 
has changed over time. It is also different for EAG versus non-
EAG states. Between the years 2005-2007, which overlapped 
with the 10th Five Year Plan  (FYP, 2002-2007), the central 
government contributed 100% of the program funding to 
all states. Subsequently, under the 11th FYP  (2007-2012), 
the central government contributed 85%, while states were 
required to contribute 15%. In the current 12th FYP  (2012-
17), this ratio changed again to 75% central government 
contribution and 25% state contribution. Exceptions to 
this rule were introduced for northeastern states and 3 
hill states where the ratio was altered to reflect a 90%-10% 
split.25 Following recommendations from the 14th Finance 
Commission, in the financial year 2015-2016, the financing 
pattern from the central government reduced from 75% to 
60%  (40% for states), while the exception for northeastern 
and hill states continued. 
Methods
Data 
Described below are 5 key variables containing annual data 
over an 8 year time periods  (2005-2013) for 16 Indian state. 
State’s own contribution to primary healthcare, the main 
outcome variable of interest, was defined as total expenditure 
incurred by the state government on primary healthcare out 
of its own allocations through the Department of Health and 
Family Welfare  (excluding central government allocations). 
State’s own contribution included both their own revenue 
from taxes that was used for primary healthcare as well as 
the central fiscal transfer to the state treasury for primary 
healthcare. These 2 component could not be analyzed 
separately for methodological reasons. While there were 
multiple global definitions of primary healthcare financing, 
the definition of state level primary healthcare financing from 
the Department of Health and Family Welfare was used to 
maintain consistency with Government of India definitions 
and classifications. Central primary healthcare expenditure 
was defined as total expenditure at the State level sourced 
from the central government and given to each State through 
the Department of Health and Family Welfare for primary 
healthcare as part of the NHM. Government primary 
healthcare expenditure  (GPHCE) at the state level was defined 
as total government expenditure on primary healthcare 
services including state government contributions and central 
government expenditure through the Department of Health 
and Family Welfare at the state level. Total government health 
expenditure at the state level was defined as total government 
expenditure on health through the Department of Health 
and Family Welfare from all sources for each state. State’s 
own revenue was the total tax revenue generated by state 
governments. 
All monetary values were standardized to 2005 constant 
rupees using the gross state domestic product deflator from 
the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation in 
India and then converted to USD using the exchange rate 
conversions extracted for relevant years from the World 
Bank conversion database.29 Per capita figures were created 
by dividing total values by the appropriate total population 
for each India state according to the National Population 
Commission. All data were examined for EAG and non-EAG 
states to understand whether spending by lower levels on 
health was increased or decreased by varying transfers from 
the central level. The 8 EAG states included in the analysis, 
defined as larger, poorer states with weak public health 
indicators and infrastructure that qualified for additional 
funding and programs, considered in our analysis were Assam, 
Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha 
(formerly Orrisa), Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. The non-
EAG states were Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. Sixteen 
states were included in the analysis using a convenience 
sampling technique that allowed for variation by population 
size and urban and rural states. The sample was also selected 
based on data availability on healthcare spending for primary 
healthcare.
All data were extracted from official Government of India 
databases, including the Reserve Bank of India as well as 
Official Financial Reports from the NHM and Ministry 
of Health. The definition and methodology for allocating 
spending to primary healath care and non-primary healthcare 
were taken directly from the National Health System Resource 
Center using the Budget Tracking Toolkit for additional 
details on budget classification.30
Methodology
The data were first examined qualitatively through several 
exhibits. The first exhibit examined trends every other year 
over the period 2005-2013, in 2005 constant USD, for the 5 
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main variables of interest  (state’s own contribution to primary 
healthcare, central primary healthcare expenditure, GPHCE 
at the state level, total government health expenditure at 
the state level, and state’s own revenue) as well as gross state 
domestic product, ratio of GPHCE at state level divided 
by total government health expenditure at state level, and 
population size for the 16 states included in the analysis. 
The second exhibit examined the per capita form of state’s 
own contribution to primary healthcare, central primary 
healthcare expenditure, GPHCE at the state level, and total 
government health expenditure at the state level for EAG and 
non-EAG states. The third exhibit examined the correlation 
between yearly changes in central primary healthcare 
expenditure per capita and state’s own contribution to primary 
healthcare per capita for EAG and non-EAG states. As part of 
the qualitative analysis, trends in state’s own contribution to 
primary healthcare per capita were quantified for those EAG 
and non-EAG states with lower and higher yearly changes in 
central primary healthcare expenditure per capita.
Finally, we used a model that captured the quantity of 
central primary healthcare expenditure distributions to the 
states in USD in state i at time t, and measured its impact on 
state’s own contribution to spending on primary healthcare 
from its own funds in USD in state i at time t, according to:
Stateownit = α + β1centralit + β2GSDPit + β3LagStateownit-1 + 
β4revit + fi + dt + εit
Where ‘Stateownit’ was the state’s own contribution to 
primary healthcare per capita, ‘centralit’ was the central primary 
healthcare expenditure per capita, ‘GSDPit’ represented the 
gross state domestic product per capita in each state at time t, 
‘LagStateownit’ was the one year lag of state’s own contribution 
to primary healthcare per capita, ‘revit’ represented each state’s 
own tax revenue generated by state governments per capita 
net the state’s own contribution to primary healthcare, ‘fi’ were 
state fixed effects, ‘dt’ were nationwide time dummies, and 
‘εit’ was an error term. As the relationship was not perfectly 
linear, all variables were log transformed for the fixed effects 
estimation.
Fixed effects were used as the statistical method in order 
to control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics of 
each state and exploit within group variation across time in 
order to estimate the coefficient of interest. The benefits of 
using this model were that characteristics of states that may 
influence the relationship between central primary healthcare 
expenditure and states’ own contribution that were also 
difficult to measure could be proxied through a fixed effects 
estimator for each state, thereby eliminating variation across 
states, which was a potential source of omitted variable bias. 
A limitation was that if the model did not capture all factors 
that influence state spending on health at the state level, 
then it could worsen remaining bias. The time dummies ‘dt’ accounted for changes in state’s own contribution to primary 
healthcare per capita over time.
The model measured the degree to which lower 
administrative levels maintain or supplement spending in 
a particular area  (“additionality”) as a result of receiving 
additional funds in said area. We examined the response 
of state level primary healthcare expenditure as a result of 
additional central level expenditure on primary healthcare to 
the state level.
We estimated this equation over 8, one-year intervals 
(2005-2013) within those 16 Indian states for which we had 
measures of both central and state-level primary healthcare 
expenditure. We used a fixed-effects panel data model to 
estimate the impact of central allocations to public health on 
each state’s subsequent own allocations to public health. The 
error term ‘εit’ may be correlated over time and we therefore 
clustered the standard errors at the state level in our reported 
results. The choice between a fixed and random-effect 
model was informed by a Hausman specification test, which 
suggested that individual fixed effects were correlated with 
other predictor variables. Variations of the main models were 
included in Supplementary file 1 (levels, interactions, and 
generalized method of moments).
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation across 
the 16 states included in the analysis for the main variables 
included in the model using real values  (2004-2005) as 
well as population size. State’s own contribution to primary 
healthcare expenditure per capita increases by 32%, from 1.53 
USD to 2.01 USD per capita over the period 2005-2013 in real 
terms. Central primary healthcare expenditure per capita at 
the state level increased by 110% from 0.65 USD to 1.35 USD 
per capita over the period 2005-2013 in real terms. State’s 
own contribution to primary healthcare as a percent of the 
GPHCE varies between 56% and 68% over the time period. 
Central primary healthcare as a percent of the GPHCE varies 
between 32% and 44% over the time period. Table 1 tracks the 
changes in each indicator relevant to the analysis.
Figure 1 shows the expenditure per capita averaged across 
all 16 states, divided into EAG and non-EAG groups. For all 
states, both total government health expenditures and GPHCE 
at the state level are trending upwards over the period 2005 
to 2013. The growth is even more rapid among non-EAG 
states. The figure shows that while central primary healthcare 
expenditure is trending upwards over the entire time period, 
there is a reduction in central allocations in 2011 and 2012, as 
a results of national policies on allocation that are examined 
empirically below. State’s own contribution to primary health 
expenditure rises steadily over the entire time period from 
2005 until 2013. Spending levels remain fairly flat in the early 
years, which is most likely due to a slowing in allocations from 
the center due low initial budget execution for some states. We 
also repeat this analysis looking at real expenditures averaged 
across all states, which follows a similar pattern. This graph 
can be seen in Figure 2.
Modeling Results
Table 2 quantifies how the magnitude of the expenditure 
on primary healthcare at the state level is affected by the 
magnitude of the transfers from the central level. The model 
relates the quantity of central primary healthcare expenditure 
distributions to the states in USD over the time period 2005-
2013, and measures the impact on state’s own contribution 
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Table 1. Mean (Standard Deviation) of Model Variables and Population Sizea
Variable 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
GPHCE per capita at the state level (2005 USD) 2.18 (0.53) 2.97 (0.92) 3.47 (0.93) 3.98 (1.15) 3.37 (1.02)
Central primary healthcare expenditure per capita (2005 USD) 0.65 (0.17) 1.12 (0.74) 1.52 (0.61) 1.56 (0.64) 1.37 (0.51)
State’s own contribution to primary healthcare expenditure per capita 
(2005 USD)
1.53 (0.48) 1.84 (0.55) 1.95 (0.56) 2.43 (0.73) 2.01 (0.63)
Central primary healthcare as a % of government primary healthcare at 
the state level 
32% (11%) 37% (14%) 44% (10%) 39% (9%) 41% (7%)
State’s own contribution to primary healthcare as a % of government 
primary healthcare at the state level 
68% (11%) 63% (14%) 56% (10%) 61% (9%) 59% (7%)
State’s own tax revenue per capita (2005 USD) 45.09 (23.43) 54.70 (28.67) 50.53 (25.33) 65.95 (35.20) 61.80 (32.45)
Population
63 356 250
(39 820 179)
65 205 313 
(41 314 683)
67 015 500
(42 848 511)
68 786 250
(44 380 155)
70 517 750
(45 905 117)
Abbreviation: GPHCE, Government primary healthcare expenditure.
a Sample size for each variable for each year is N=16 except for year 2007 where Andhra Pradesh had missing figures for the following indicators:  GPHCE at the 
state level, GPHCE per capita at the state level, state’s own contribution to primary healthcare expenditure and state’s own contribution to primary healthcare 
expenditure per capita; and year 2007 where Jharkand and Kartanaka had missing figures for the following indicators: state’s own tax revenue and state’s own 
tax revenue per capita missing for Jharkand in 2007 and Karnataka in 2009. Exchange rate conversions were extracted for relevant years from the World Bank 
conversion database.29
Figure 1. Average Per Capita Central and State Level Government Expenditures for EAG and non-EAG Indian States, 2005-2013, (2005 USD). Abbreviation: EAG, 
Empowered Action Group.
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to primary healthcare expenditure from its own funds in 
USD. As shown in Table 2, a 1% increase in central primary 
healthcare expenditure per capita is associated with a 0.151% 
reduction in state’s own contribution to primary healthcare 
expenditure per capita  (P < .01), controlling for log of per 
capita GSDP, lagged levels of state’s own contribution to 
primary healthcare, log of state’s own tax revenue per capita 
net primary healthcare revenues, as well as state fixed effects 
and time trends. For all states combined and non-EAG states, 
the magnitude and direction of change are the same as non-
EAG states, but the results are not significant. How much each 
state prioritizes primary healthcare expenditure, proxied with 
lagged levels of state’s own spending on primary healthcare, 
has a significant positive impact on state’s own contribution 
to primary healthcare expenditure per capita, which is 
significant for all states and non-EAG states. This may reflect 
some type of expenditure momentum, in that most states’ own 
contribution to primary healthcare expenditure per capita is 
Figure 2. Average Total, Central and State Level Government Expenditures for 
16 Indian States, 2005-2013, Million (2005 USD).
Table 2. Results of Model Relating Central Primary Healthcare Expenditure Per Capita to State’s Own Contribution to Primary Healthcare Expenditure Per Capita, 
2005 USD, 2005-2013
Log of State’s Own Primary 
Healthcare Expenditure Per 
Capita, (2005 USD)
Log of State’s Own Primary 
Healthcare Expenditure Per 
Capita, (2005 USD) Non-EAG
Log of State’s Own Primary 
Healthcare Expenditure Per 
Capita, (2005 USD) EAG
Log central primary healthcare expenditure per capita -0.132 (0.084) -0.151 (0.041)*** -0.096 (0.179)
Log GSDP per capita 0.449 (0.478) 1.552 (0.618)** -0.016 (0.802)
Log state’s own primary healthcare expenditure per 
capita lagged (t-1)
0.255 (0.131)* 0.405 (0.081)*** 0.111 (0.168)
State’s own tax revenue per capita -0.608 (0.481) -0.549 (0.344) -0.786 (0.592)
Constant -0.006 (3.115) -7.871 (3.835)* 3.425 (4.523)
N 125 61 64
States 16 8 8
R2 0.51 0.76 0.44
Abbreviations: GSDP, gross state domestic product; EAG, Empowered Action Group.
* P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < .01, cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
for non-discretionary items like salaries.
Discussion 
The results above show important new evidence of how 
India’s central GPHCEs passed on to Indian states, impact 
states’ own contributions to primary healthcare expenditure. 
We find evidence of a lack of additionality of central funding 
across all Indian states. On average during this period, states 
reduce their own spending by 0.132% for every 1% increase in 
central funding, although this result is not significant. There 
is a statistically significant reduction in state’s own spending 
on primary healthcare, -0.151%, for non-EAG Indian States, 
and statistically not significant for EAG states. Overall, we 
find no evidence that receiving additional funds from the 
central level stimulates stable or increasing funding by states 
during a period of significantly increased central funding. 
There are only a few other studies that have examined this 
relationship between central and state level expenditure on 
primary healthcare in India. For example, Rao and Choudhury 
examined the relationship between central primary healthcare 
expenditure and each state’s own contributions to primary 
healthcare expenditure between 1991 and 2007 in 14 Indian 
states.1 They also found a significant negative effect in the 
range of -0.91 for the period 1991 to 2007 and -1.059 for 
the period 2001-2007. The coefficient found in this paper is 
smaller, most likely due to using a log transformed model.24 
When the above model is not transformed and only more 
wealthy states are included, the coefficient approaches that 
of  (-0.41).24 Comparing our results to these older results are 
interesting for 2 reasons. First, there seems to be a change 
in additionality for poorer states, as their coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero in our current analysis, and 
may have been more negative in the past. Secondly, the overall 
lack of additionality may be reducing over time, as states may 
be increasingly likely to allocate more resources to primary 
healthcare in addition to central level expenditure. 
Hooda’s analysis examines general public health 
expenditures in India, finding that some states are not able to 
absorb and use all the funds allocated to them by the central 
government in a timely way.31 Therefore, these states may 
differentially have to spend their own, additional revenues to 
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support primary healthcare. Those states that are better able 
to absorb and use central funds can better allocate their own 
funds away from health. Hooda suggests that those states that 
are not able to spend allocated funds are hindered by issues of 
inadequate human resources, poor infrastructure and weak 
technical capability.31
Related work examining individual states’ spending has 
shown that wealthier states are better able to use central 
allocations and over time have captured more of them.30 
Wealthier states’ ability to capture more central expenditure 
for primary healthcare is likely to be associated with shifting 
more of their own spending to non-primary healthcare uses 
(ie, less additionality to primary healthcare). It is possible that 
states are responding to changes in central grants by treating 
tied funds more like general revenue through displacing their 
own funding away from primary healthcare. 
Berman, Bhawalker, and Jha qualitatively examine some of 
the mechanisms for additionality in poorer and richer states, 
as quantitatively modeled above. They report that although 
poorer states were given greater opportunities to use increased 
central funds, they generally were less able to do so, often due 
to failings in public financial management.30 This undermines 
the mission of targeted support for primary healthcare in the 
lagging states and results in increasing spending differentials 
across states, even though a key goal of central spending is to 
reduce such disparities. 
 Our results suggest that central funds overall were not 
successful in incentivizing increases in state spending. In 
wealthier states, lower additionality was found as states 
diverted expenditures away from primary healthcare as 
central expenditures increased. In poorer states, evidence 
for this substitution was not conclusive. Overall, the fiscal 
mechanisms of the NRHM/NHM do not seem to have 
consistently achieved their objectives. This is in part because 
in EAG states have a higher burden and need for primary care 
services, where as in non-EAG states, who often have a more 
robust tertiary care system, they may face pressures to divert 
expenditure away from primary healthcare to other health 
needs. 
Given the central government’s stated commitment to equity 
and pro-poor policies, they may need to reconsider methods 
used to allocate funds to states for primary healthcare. The 
factors that influence states’ behavior, as partially examined 
by Hooda and Berman, also need to be examined in more 
detail. 
One approach to assuring additionality has been to require 
states to increase their own spending in proportion to central 
grants, as in the current form of fiscal decentralization in 
India. However, this may be difficult to monitor and enforce 
without explicit accounting standards to measure before and 
after spending. Frequent elections and changes in political 
alignment in India also make enforcement less reliable. 
An alternative approach is to make future central allocations 
proportional to, and conditional on, increased state 
allocations. The central government could propose offsetting 
a percentage of increased state budget plans. However, this 
would place the poorer states at a disadvantage given their 
more limited fiscal capacity. One approach reflected in recent 
years has been to provide more central funding in the form 
of untied block grants to states, giving them a greater role in 
overall resource allocation across sectors  (health vs. non-
health) as well as within sectors  (primary healthcare vs. 
hospitals, for example). It is unclear what effect this might 
have on states’ primary healthcare spending overall. 
Our results control for several important factors including 
fixed effects as well as GSDP, the ratio of GPHCE at state 
level/total government health expenditure at state level, and 
state’s own tax revenue per capita. Controlling for fixed effects 
is important to show that even in states with similar levels of 
some of the unmeasurable factors that might impact primary 
healthcare expenditure, such as motivation, states reduce 
their own expenditure to primary healthcare depending on 
central level expenditure. Our results reflect including GSDP 
in the model, suggesting that GSDP differences alone are not 
enough to explain the reduction in states’ own investments in 
primary healthcare. 
Our results are subject to limitations of data availability 
and data quality. The requisite data on state expenditures and 
central government transfers are not available for all states, 
thus our estimates are only valid to the states included in 
our sample and may not be generalizable to other states. By 
introducing a differenced two-way fixed effects model, we are 
able to control for all state-level effects that are constant by 
year and all year-level effects that are constant by state, which 
eliminates the burden of some omitted variables. However, as 
a result of these modeling choices, the estimated relationships 
should not be applied to any single state in any single year but 
rather be taken as a look at homogenous effects across states 
and years. For this same reason, there may be some selection 
bias in the models as those states with better and available data 
are the ones included in the analysis. In addition, the analysis 
focuses exclusively on spending for primary healthcare and 
did not include spending on higher-level services financed 
through schemes such as the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana. 
Finally, our analysis should not be taken as the demonstration 
of a causal effect between predictors and outcome. However, 
we do believe that our findings are in line with basic economic 
theories as well as past research on additionality in total health 
expenditure and the fungibility of other types of aid. Our key 
findings are a significant step in exploring the fungibility 
of central grants to primary healthcare using the best data 
available at this time. 
Conclusion
This paper evaluates the degree of additionality provided by 
central grants for primary healthcare in India. Our analysis 
suggests that there is a lack of an additionality effect between 
central allocations and state’s own contribution to public 
health, especially in wealthier states. The effect in wealthier 
states is negative and greater than random variation would 
predict. While still negative in poorer, more populous states, 
we cannot distinguish this from no effect at all. Given the 
importance of increasing investment in primary healthcare to 
address health equity and population health outcomes, these 
results suggest that central government efforts to affect state 
spending and priorities need further development. In addition, 
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the relationship between additionality and the ability to absorb 
and spend central level funds is an important future research 
question. This finding is especially relevant today when the 
central government has significantly increased block grants to 
the states in place of targeted program expenditures.5
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